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SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAWS GOVERNING
CIVIL TORTURE CLAIMS IN U.S. COURTS
Solomon B. Shinerock*

The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Samantar v. Yousuf forecloses one possible avenue by which former foreign-government officials
residing in the United States have sought to escape liability for human
rights violations. Ruling simply that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA or Act) 2 does not provide immunity to individuals, the decision raises the question of which common law principles will govern the
issue in the future. This article reviews the case as well as the common law
doctrines that will likely be prominent in future civil suits alleging torture.
Ultimately, the Samantardecision, when read together with existing principles of domestic and international law, indicates the beginning contours of a
more sophisticated regime of immunity. Under that regime, perpetrators of
torture residing in the United States will not be immune from legitimate
lawsuits on the basis of their former status as foreign officials where the
pursuit of such claims does not interfere with the Executive's pursuit of
foreign policy objectives.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AND

FSIA

The Samantarcase involves atrocities committed in Somalia during
the 1980s, including allegations of rape, torture, arbitrary imprisonment,
and extrajudicial killings. The plaintiffs were Somali members of the Isaaq
clan, and included two U.S. citizens and three Somaliland residents. 3 They
* Solomon Shinerock is currently a law clerk to the Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., in the
Southern District of New York. He is a graduate of American University Washington College of Law, and has previously worked for the War Crimes Research Office at American University and provided research and writing support to the
United Nations Committee Against Torture. He also interned at the United States
Department of Justice, Criminal Division, in a section responsible for the prosecution of extraterritorial human rights violations and other international crimes under
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.
1 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
2
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
3 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2280; 552 F.3d 371, 373-4 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009), aff'd and remanded by 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010); see

also Brief of Respondent at 4, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (Jan. 20, 2010)
(No. 08-1555).

156

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17

were either the victims of torture or represented the estates of victims of
torture and extrajudicial killings.4 The defendant, Bashe Abdi Samantar,
was an official in the government of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre,
the individual who in 1969 overthrew the Somali democratic government
put into place after the end of British and Italian colonial rule.5 Samantar
served as Barre's First Vice President, Minister of Defense and finally as
Prime Minister. 6 During Samantar's government service, the Barre regime
used military and security forces to violently suppress opposition movements and ethnic minorities, including the Isaaq clan, which were seen as
threats to the regime.7 After the Barre regime collapsed, Samantar fled the
country, eventually settling in Fairfax, Virginia.8
The plaintiffs filed suit in 2004 under the Torture Victim Protection
Act (TVPA)9 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).' 0 They argued that Samantar exercised command and control over members of the Somali military forces who tortured, killed, or arbitrarily detained them or members of
their families. They alleged that Samantar "knew or should have known" of
the abuses, and that he gave his tacit approval for the abuses and "aided and
abetted in their commission."" The district court stayed the proceedings
pending a statement of interest from the State Department, but after two
Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 374.
Id. at 373; Brief of Respondent at 3, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010) (No. 08-1555).
6
Brief of Respondent, supra note 5, at 3.
7 Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373-74.
9 Id. at 374; Brief of Respondent, supra note 5, at 3.
9 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat. 73) 84 (1992) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2010) note (creates a cause of action for
money damages against individuals who "under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation" commit torture or extrajudicial killings, provided the claimant exhausts "adequate and available remedies in the place in which
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred")).
1o 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2010) (provides that the district courts "shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). This grant of
jurisdiction has been translated as applying to cases for treaty-based or federal
common law causes of action enforcing universally accepted and carefully defined
international norms admitting of a judicial remedy. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 715, 732 (2004). The prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing
have been considered to rise to the level of universal acceptance and definition
sufficient to fall within the ambit of the ATS. See id. at 728; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
"1 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2280; Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 374.
4

5
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years elapsed with no response, it lifted the stay.12 In 2007, the court
granted Samantar's motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the FSIA
extends immunity to former government officials, thus shielding Samantar's acts from civil liability.' 3 The Fourth Circuit reversed, adopting
the minority view that the FSIA does not apply to individuals,'14 and the
5
Supreme Court granted certiorari.1
The FSIA, enacted in 1976, codified then-existing practice developed by the U.S. Department of State and the courts of providing "restrictive" immunity to foreign governments sued in U.S. courts.' 6 The principle
of restrictive immunity displaced the earlier approach to sovereign immunity whereby the Executive branch provided near absolute immunity to foreign states; thus, restrictive immunity - and ultimately the FSIA - came to
limit the availability of sovereign immunity and shifted any discretion for
granting such immunity away from the Executive branch and towards the
courts.' 7 The FSIA starts from the general rule that foreign governments are
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283. The State Department's long silence in this case
suggests that the dispute will remain within the jurisdiction of the courts to decide.
But see John B. Bellinger III, Ruling Burdens State Dep't., NAT'L L.J., June 28,
2010, at para. 5, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202463009727&slretum=1&hbxlogin=1 ("[T]he State Department is likely to assert immunity on behalf of most foreign government officials sued for alleged
human rights violations.").
13 Bellinger, supra note 12, at para. 3; see also Samantar v. Yousuf, No.
1:04CV1360, WL 2220579 at 8, 14-15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007), rev'd and remanded by Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (2009), cert. granted Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009), affd and remanded by Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.
Ct. 2278 (2010) (quoting Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.
2004)).
14
Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 383.
15 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (Sept. 30, 2009), aff'd and remanded by
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
16 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2278; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 6605 (1976).
'7 See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89
(1983) ("For more than a century and a half, the United States generally granted
foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this country ...
however, foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of
the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution."); Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); Letter from Jack B.
Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of St. to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att'y
Gen., DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (May 19, 1952) (questioning the practice of granting
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns and announcing the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity).
12
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immune from suit unless otherwise provided by international agreement.,,
It then carves out a number of exceptions to this general rule relating to
commercial activities, express or implied waiver, expropriation of property
in violation of international law, non-commercial torts occurring in the
United States, and disputes over rights in real property and estates located
in the United States.' 9 These exceptions have been used with some success
by human rights litigants.20 The exception for non-commercial torts occurring in the United States was added as an amendment in 1996 and has
raised some hope for a human rights exception to sovereign immunity. 21
However, it has provided only limited means for pursuing remedies for
human rights violations, and is intended primarily for victims of terrorism. 22
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Court held without dissent that the FSIA does not provide immunity to individuals for acts performed in their official capacities as officers of foreign governments. The decision reversed a number of circuit
court opinions, but left some important questions unanswered concerning
18 28 U.S.C.
'9 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604 (1976).
§§ 1605-1607 (2008); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess

Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) (holding that "FSIA provides the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country ...
to the exclusion of other exceptions that may have existed at common law).
20 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992) (reinstating torture claims against Argentina where the plaintiffs presented
evidence sufficient to support a finding that Argentina had implicitly waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to the plaintiffs' claims of torture).
21 See Ismael Diaz, A Critique of Proposalsto Amend the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act to Allow Suits Against Foreign Sovereignsfor Human Rights Violations, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 137, 146 (2001) (discussing the successful
utilization of the non-commercial tort exception where the former Ambassador of
Chile was murdered in Washington, D.C. by the Chilean Secret Service).
22 The main impediment in this regard is the requirement that the tort occur in the
United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2008). However, the provision has
proved useful in providing a remedy to U.S. citizens injured by a terrorist attack
occurring in the United States. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,
672-73 (D.D.C. 1980) (plaintiff successfully invoked the non-commercial tort exception to overcome the sovereign immunity of Chile in connection with the Chilean secret service's car bombing, in Washington D.C., of the former Chilean
Ambassador and an aide); cf Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 304
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (refusing to dismiss wrongful death suit on FSIA grounds in assassination case).
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the ultimate ability of former government officials to claim immunity from
human rights allegations under the common law.
While Samantar has been widely applauded by human rights
groups as an important step forward in holding torturers accountable, its
holding is fairly narrow and was driven not by the facts, but by the text of
the FSIA. The FSIA provides, "a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States" except as
provided elsewhere in the Act. 23 The central issue before the Court in Samantar was whether an individual sued for conduct undertaken in his official capacity is immune as a "foreign state" within the meaning of the Act. 24
Resolving a circuit split,25 the Court held that the meaning of "foreign state"
did not encompass "an individual sued for conduct undertaken in his official capacity." 26 Focusing on the text of the Act, the Court declined to extend the FSIA's provisions to individuals "without so much as a whisper
from Congress on the subject." 27
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stressed that the ruling was a
narrow one. Holding only that the FSIA did not govern the defendant's
immunity claims, he expressed no opinion as to whether the defendant had
viable claims to immunity based on customary international law or common
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
24 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
25 Compare In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81 (2d
Cir. 2008) ("We join our sister circuits in holding that an individual official of a
foreign state acting in his official capacity is the 'agency or instrumentality' of the
state, and is thereby protected by the FSIA."); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277
F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de
Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1999); Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan
Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Chuidian v.
Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the immu23

nity granted by the FSIA extends to individual governmental officials for acts taken

in their official capacity), with Yousuf, 552 F.3d 381, and Enahoro v. Abubakar,
408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that it does not).
26 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2286.
27 Id. at 2288. The majority opinion references the statute's legislative history a
choice that caused Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito to write separately, concurring
in the result but objecting to the Court's use of legislative history as an interpretive
tool. A lengthy footnote in the Stevens opinion addresses the use of legislative
history, engaging in a dialogue with Scalia's concurrence and revealing some of the
technical differences between the two Justices' judicial philosophies and adding to
a long-standing debate regarding the proper approach to statutory interpretation.
Compare id. at 2287 n.9, with id. at 2293-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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law principles that were not codified in the FSIA and therefore not before
the Court. 28 Those issues were left to the district court on remand. 2 9
M.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS AND
REMAINING ISSUES OF IMMUNITY

The exclusion of individuals from the scope of the FSIA has several
important implications in civil prosecution for torture committed by former
officials who seek refuge in the United States. First, in the context of such
cases, defendants may no longer raise the shield of FSIA immunity, nor
may plaintiffs avail themselves of the exceptions to foreign state immunity
codified in the Act. These implications establish the common law as the
arena for the fight over the availability of immunity for foreign officials - a
fight that has been central to many U.S. lawsuits seeking vindication for the
victims of torture committed abroad.
In view of the Samantar decision, the next critical issue is one that
the district court must grapple with on remand: whether the defendant is
entitled to immunity under the common law. The ability of district courts to

properly understand and apply the various common law doctrines governing
immunity will be central to the ability of the federal court system to achieve

the appropriate balance between the rising tide of interest in justice for international human rights violations and the foreign relations concerns animating traditional doctrines of immunity, including principles of
sovereignty, comity, and the ability of the Executive to pursue the peaceful
maintenance of international relations on its own terms. Notably, several
common law doctrines guide courts in achieving this balance, including the
act of state doctrine, head of state immunity, and the jus cogens status of the
prohibition against torture, and, as seen in Samantar, have been raised in

litigation concerning claims of torture and summary execution.

0

Id. at 2293-94.
Id.
30 Certain immunities also apply to specific officers, such as diplomats, individuals on official missions, and other foreign representatives, but those immunities are
largely governed by treaties and statutes, and premised on the international consensus that as a general rule, a State's ability to pursue activities in foreign relations
through its officers and agents should not be compromised by allowing suits
against those officers to proceed. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227 (diplomatic immunity); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol
on Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 (consular immunity); NATO Status of
Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792 (immunity for NATO military
and civilian personnel).

28
29
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Act of state doctrine

The act of state doctrine is a principle of comity whereby national
courts refrain from passing judgment on the legality of public acts undertaken by a foreign government within its own territory.' It is closely related
to the more general foreign official immunity, according to which a foreign
sovereign is generally immune from suit in the territory of another sovereign3 2 - an immunity that was understood to extend to foreign officials
acting in an official capacity. 33 It seems an especially likely argument for
Samantar to raise on remand in light of the multiple letters from the current
Somali regime to the U.S. Department of State, which support Samantar's
immunity claims and assert that "the actions attributed to Mr. Samantar in
the lawsuit . . . would have been taken by Mr. Samantar in his official

capacity on behalf of Somalia." 34
Like sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine is born of the
principle that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."3 5 However, it provides a defense on the merits rather than a jurisdictional bar, and as applied, it focuses not on the identity of the defendant
but "on the relief sought or the defense interposed." 36
The act of state doctrine has been applied to resolve human rights
claims against individual foreign officials for actions taken in their official
capacity. Several U.S. courts have held that human rights violations were
not lawful or authoritative public acts justifying application of the act of
state doctrine, particularly when viewed in conjunction with violations of
jus cogens norms. 7 A review of relevant cases from the United States, inSee Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) ("The act
of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory.").
32 See Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145-46 (1812).
33 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
34 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 10 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
35 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
36 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405
(1990).
3
See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding that torture, execution, and disappearance at the hands of the
former Philippine president were outside his authority as president, and could not
be considered acts of state; FSIA accordingly did not apply, and plaintiff was not
3'

162

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17

ternational criminal tribunals, and foreign courts reveals an emerging consensus that egregious violations of jus cogens norms, such as the
prohibition of torture, cannot be official acts of state that preclude review
by the courts.18 Senate documents note that the act of state doctrine "applies
only to 'public' acts, and no state commits torture as a matter of public
policy." 39 The Senate Judiciary Committee's intent was unmistakable when
it articulated that it "does not intend the 'act of state' doctrine to provide a
shield from lawsuit."4 0
Furthermore, while the act of state doctrine, like sovereign immunity, is not compelled by the Constitution, its constitutional underpinnings
required to demonstrate an exception to immunity); Hilao v. Marcos, 878 F.2d
1438 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing the dismissal of several human rights suits against
President Marcos on act of state grounds); Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th
Cir. 1989); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding
that Gramajo's alleged commission torture and arbitrary detention exceeded anything that could be considered lawfully within the scope of his official authority
and could not be considered acts of state for purposes of the FSIA or immunity);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that acts of torture, extrajudicial
execution, and arbitrary detention by a former member of the junta conducting
Argentina's "dirty war" were not acts of state); see also Republic of the Philippines
v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) and Republic of the Philippines v.
Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 357-60 (2d Cir. 1986) (declining to apply the act of state
doctrine to conduct beyond the scope of proper governmental authority, where both
cases involved claims that Marcos had looted the national treasury and where both
courts rejected a liberal approach to the act of state doctrine and relied upon a
distinction between official and private acts, suggesting the possibility that the act
of state doctrine will not bar recovery for victims of torture.). For a discussion of
exceptions to immunity developed under international law and under regional
human rights systems, see Cynthia R.L. Fairweather, Obstacles to Enforcing InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y
119, 139-45 (1998). For a discussion of the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine in human rights litigation, see, e.g., Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7 HARV. Hum. RTs. J. 177 (1994);
Lynn E. Parseghian, Defining the "Public Act" Requirement in the Act of State
Doctrine,58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (1991); Andrew Saindon, Note, The Act of State
Doctrine and InternationalHuman Rights Cases in United States Courts, 7 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 287 (1995/96).
38 See, e.g., Stacy Humes-Schulz, Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of
Human Rights, 21 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 105, 114-16 (2008).
39

SEN. COMM'N ON THE JUDICIARY, THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF

1991, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 8 (1991).
Id.

40
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arise out of the separation of powers and through the recognition that the
Executive branch is the appropriate arbiter of matters affecting foreign relations. 4 1 This characteristic provides potential openings for victims to seek
redress before the courts, even potentially based on the very cases that have
traditionally given the act of state doctrine its broad sweep. For example,
the Supreme Court has stated that the "continuing vitality" of the act of
state doctrine "depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on
matters bearing upon foreign affairs." 4 2 Importantly, this statement means
that "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more .

.

. the courts can then focus on

the application of an agreed upon principle to circumstances of fact rather
than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with
the national interest or with international justice." 43 Accordingly, the pervasiveness of statutes and treaties affirming the prohibition against torture,
which reinforces a strong international consensus, makes the act of state
doctrine a proper principle for courts to utilize without having to worry
about disturbing national interest or international justice.
This reasoning represents an opportunity for torture victims to argue that, due to the well-established nature of the prohibition against torture
and its universal recognition by nations, the act of state doctrine should not
impede civil claims alleging torture because it does not disturb the Executive branch's prerogative in foreign relations; to the contrary, civil prosecution of torture is fully consistent with well-established domestic and
international policies, statutes, and treaties prohibiting torture.
The so-called "Bernstein exception" presents another basis for arguing against the applicability of the act of state doctrine to torture claims.
According to this exception, courts should not apply the act of state doctrine
where the Executive branch expressly declines the use of the doctrine to
advance U.S. foreign policy interests." Given the United States' increased
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (act of state
"arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system
of separation of powers").
42 Id. at 427-28.
43 Id. at 428.
" First National City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972)
("Where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that application of the
act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign policy,
that doctrine should not be applied by the courts.").
41
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attention to the prohibition against torture, 45 soliciting such an expression
from the Executive branch may present another potential avenue for torture
victims to preclude application of the act of state doctrine.
Like foreign sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine only extends to public acts, and thus allows a "commercial activity" exception intended to protect the reasonable expectations of trading partners of a state
and its entities. 46 A second analogous exception exists where a treaty provides a controlling legal standard in the area of international law. 47 These
exceptions provide another argument in light of U.S. obligations under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), 48 and
the clear and detailed regime it prescribes for imposing civil and criminal
liability for acts of torture. 4 9
B.

Head of state immunity

Head of state immunity developed under the common law "premised on the concept that a state and its ruler are one for purposes of immunity," and "that all states are equal, and that no one state may exercise
See, e.g., Elise Keppler, Shirley Jean, & J. Paxton Marshall, First Prosecution
in the UnitedStatesfor Torture Committed Abroad: The Trial of Charles 'Chuckie'
Taylor, Jr., 15 No. 3 Hum. RTs. BRIEF 18, 18 (2008) (discussing increased legislative and prosecutorial efforts aimed at the prohibition against torture).
46
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976)
("[W]e are nevertheless persuaded ... that the concept of an act of state should not
be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a
foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities.").
47 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Eth.,
729 F.2d 422, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1984) (allowing the treaty exception to preclude
application of the act of state doctrine in view of a Treaty of Amity between Ethiopia and the United States that provided a controlling legal standard).
48 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (June 26, 1987).
49 The U.K. House of Lords adopted the essence of this exception in the famous
Pinochet case, where it concluded that immunities did not apply to claims including
torture in light of the U.K.'s obligations under the controlling provisions of the
Convention Against Torture. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police
for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999] UKHL 17 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Q.B.) (opinion of Saville of Newdigate, L.J.), availableat http://iilj.org/
courses/documents/Reginav.Bartle-ex.p.Pinochet.pdf.
45
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judicial authority over another."50 An early court noted, "[a] head of state
recognized by the United States government is absolutely immune from
personal jurisdiction in United States courts unless that immunity has been
waived by statute or by the foreign government recognized by the United
States."" In the context of human rights cases, head of state immunity applies on an almost de facto basis as a matter of political expediency, because a diplomatic promise not to prosecute is often a key negotiating piece
when the head of a dictatorial regime, having committed human rights violations, is pressured to stand down, or other political pressures make prosecution a political impossibility. 52
However, former, as opposed to sitting, heads of state generally
have not been granted immunity from prosecution for violations of domestic and international law. 5 3 A number of factors thus contribute to the possibility of redress for torture committed by former heads of state.
First, a current head of state may waive immunity of former heads
54
of state. Second, unlike sitting heads of state, former heads of state do not
enjoy immunity for acts taken outside the scope of official duties. 5 For
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812)).
s Id. at 131-32 (applying immunity to shield Haiti's head of state from liability
for an alleged extrajudicial killing on the basis that the Executive branch's suggestion of immunity was controlling).
52 See M. Sherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on InternationalCriminal Justice, 50
VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 311-17 (2010).
5 United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he FISA
addresses neither head-of-state immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the
criminal context . . . ."), affg 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[T]here is ample doubt whether head of state immunity extends to private or
criminal acts in violation of U.S. law."); Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547,
557-58 (5th Cir. 1962) (no immunity for violations of foreign law); see, e.g., Doe v.
United States, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) at 135); cf Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 350-55 (1822) (no immunity for violations of international law).
54 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1987)
(finding the former leader of the Philippines civilly liable for failing to comply with
federal grand jury subpoenas where the then-current President of the Philippines
waived the privilege); see also Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (providing that the then-recognized Haitian government could waive head of
state immunity of the former head of military government, which waiver extended
to whatever residual head-of-state immunity defendant possessed).
5 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d at 45 ("[T]here is respectable authority
for denying head-of-state immunity to a former head-of-state for private or criminal
5o
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example, the Second Circuit rejected the claim of Ferdinand Marcos of sovereign immunity against allegations of systematic torture, disappearances,
56
and summary execution in Republic of Philippines v. Marcos. The court
expressed doubt that "the immunity of a foreign state, though it extends to
its head of state,

. .

. goes so far as to render a former head of state immune

as regards his private acts."5 7
Third, tension exists between the traditional immunity doctrines
and U.S. efforts to eradicate torture. Legislation incorporating the international prohibition against torture appears after the development of traditional principles of immunity, and thus ostensibly supersedes and derogates
from traditional immunity principles.58 While some support exists for the
argument that the TVPA was not intended to overcome traditional immuniacts in violation of American law."); Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of
Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999] UKHL 17 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Q.B.) (opinion of Saville of Newdigate, L.J.), availableat http:/
/iilj.org/courses/documents/Reginav.Bartle-ex.p.Pinochet.pdf ("[M]y conclusion
that Senator Pinochet is not entitled to immunity is based on the view that the
commission of acts of torture is not a function of a head of state and therefore, in
this case, the immunity to which Senator Pinochet is entitled as a former head of
state does not arise in relation to, and does not attach to, acts of torture."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 464,
REP. NOTE 14 (1987) (a former head of state would "have no immunity from [a U.S.
court's] jurisdiction to adjudicate" claims arising out of their acts while in office);
Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of
Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 195 (1986) (noting that one of the principle reasons
for granting immunity to heads of state does not apply to former heads of state: that
the "inviolability of the head of state's person coheres with the basic rules of diplomatic intercourse, which allow government officials to perform their functions
unencumbered by the threat or possibility of arrest or detention").
56 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 348, 360 (2d Cir. 1986).
57 Id. at 360; see also Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1519 n.11 (observing in dictum
that "there is ample doubt whether head of state immunity extends to private or
criminal acts in violation of U.S. law").
Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (1994)
58 See Extraterritorial
(criminalizing torture in accordance with U.S. obligations under the U.N. Convention Against Torture) and TVPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992) (providing a civil action
for torture), which presumably trump any inconsistent common law immunity doctrine pre-dating them. See also FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976)
amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 1214) 944 (1996) (far from reverting to a more comprehensive immunity regime, the amendments were intended to allow suits by U.S.
nationals for certain international crimes and human rights violations against states
designated as "terrorist" by the U.S. Department of State).
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ties, 59 logically, the TVPA must overcome at least some level of official or
sovereign immunity. Congress intended the TVPA to "carry out the intent
of the Convention Against Torture . . . by making sure that torturers and

death squads will no longer have a safe haven in the United States." 60 Because torture is by definition committed under color of law, the TVPA may
encroach on some amount of official or foreign sovereign immunity,
whether under the FSIA or common law. 6 1
Moreover, the immunity doctrine may face significant limitations,
thus allowing prosecution of former officials. For example, the Second Circuit denied head of state immunity to Radovan Karadzic, the former president of the Republic of Srpska, in two suits brought under the ATS and the
TVPA because the United States did not recognize him as the head of state
of a friendly nation.62 Similarly, while noting that "nothing in the TVPA
overrides the doctrines of diplomatic and head-of-state immunity," Congress has said that "[t]hese doctrines would generally provide a defense to
suits against foreign heads of state and other diplomats visiting the United
States on official business." 63 This careful delimitation by Congress, asserting that these immunity doctrines merely apply "generally" and to officials
visiting "on official business," suggests that head of state immunity and
59

See

ACT

OF

SENATE COMM'N ON THE JUDICIARY, THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION
1991, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7-8 (1991) ("The TVPA is not intended to

override traditional diplomatic immunities which prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts over foreign diplomats.
subject to suits under the TVPA.").

. .

. Nor should visiting heads of state be

Id. at 3.
In an analogous argument in the Pinochet case, the U.K. House of Lords has
said that it "cannot see how, so far as torture is concerned, this immunity can exist
consistently with the terms of [the Convention Against Torture, whereby] each
State party has agreed that the other states parties can exercise jurisdiction over
alleged official torturers found within their territories." Regina v. Bartle and the
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex PartePinochet, [1999]
UKHL 17 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (opinion of Saville of Newdigate, L.J.),
available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/Reginav.Bartle-ex.p.Pinochet.pdf.
62 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
63 See HOUSE COMM'N ON THE JUDICIARY, THE TORTURE VICTIMS PROTECTION
ACT OF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
60
61

84, 88 102nd Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1 (1991), 1992 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin.
News 84, 88 ("[N]othing in the TVPA overrides the doctrines of diplomatic and
head-of-state immunity .

. .

. These doctrines would generally provide a defense to

suits against foreign heads of state and other diplomats visiting the United States on
official business.").
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diplomatic immunity may not be insurmountable hurdles for torture victims
seeking redress in U.S. courts.
C.

The jus cogens characterof the prohibitionagainst torture

Finally, there is significant support for the theory that the defendants charged with violations of an international jus cogens norm such as the
prohibition against torture may not avail themselves of immunity under the
common law. The argument goes that because principles of immunity are
themselves creatures of international law, and because jus cogens norms
supersede other principles of international law, suits charging violations of
the prohibition of torture are not subject to dismissal on immunity
grounds.64 The Ninth Circuit has cited this argument with approval, but
noted that Supreme Court precedent precluded its adoption with respect to
the FSIA, and it was up to Congress to develop the law of immunity in view
of the absolute character of norms such as the prohibition against torture. 65
However, where the FSIA is not involved, there is a strong argument that
the jus cogens status of the prohibition of torture, which has been recognized in the United States,66 supersedes any claim to immunity that could be
asserted under the common law. 67
6

See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th

Cir. 1992) ("A state's violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture
therefore would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.").
65 See id. at 718-19, citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co.,
488 U.S. 428, 436.
66 See Extraterritorial Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A (making it a
crime to commit torture abroad, and applying to U.S. citizens and non-citizens present in the United States); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (June 26, 1987); Siderman de Blake,
965 F.2d at 717 (concluding that "the right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law,
a norm of jus cogens"); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (announcing that torture is one of a handful of acts
that constitute violations of jus cogens); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987); Keppler, supra note 43, at
18 (discussing the exceptional jurisdictional reach of the Extraterritorial Torture

Statute).
See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and
Others, Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999] UKHL 17 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.)
(opinion of Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.), availableat http://iilj.org/courses/documents/
Reginav.Bartle-ex.p.Pinochet.pdf., paras. 47-57 (concluding that the former dictator of Argentina had no immunity from prosecution for the charges of torture and
67
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IV. CONCLUSION

While leaving the assessment of any common law immunity claims
to the district court, the Samantaropinion did hint at some of the principles
that ought to be considered in making the assessment. For instance, the
Court noted that, under Section 66 of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, "the immunity of a foreign state

extends to a foreign official or agent with respect to acts performed in his
official capacity [only] if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to
enforce a rule of law againstthe state."68 While the Samantar opinion de-

clined to express a view on "whether RESTATEMENT § 66 correctly sets out
the scope of the common law immunity applicable to current or former
foreign officials," 69 other Supreme Court decisions suggest that it does. For
example, the Court has held that when determining whether a suit against
an individual official is in substance a suit against a state for purposes of
avoiding an immunity doctrine, the critical question is whether the suit
seeks monetary damages from the individual named defendant or whether it
seeks damages or some other relief from a sovereign. 70 Immunity attaches
by operation of the "effect of the judgment" in "restrain[ing] the Government from acting, or compel[ling] it to act." 7' This application provides
convincing reasoning to hold that sovereign immunities should not apply to
civil claims seeking monetary damages against former officials for acts of
torture.
of conspiracy to torture which relate to the period after the ratification of the Convention against Torture).
68 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. at 2290 (quoting THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 66 (1965)).
69

Id. at n.15.

See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-88
(1949) (suits seeking the payment of damages by the individual defendant do not

70

trigger sovereign immunity because the money judgment sought "will not require
action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign's property," while suits seeking
injunctive relief are against the state if they would result in "compulsion against the
sovereign, although nominally directed against the individual officer"). See also
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (A state officer may be sued in his
individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct "so long as the relief
is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally.").
71 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.l 1 (1983).
Similarly, as noted above, the act of state doctrine focuses not on the identity of the
defendant, but on "the relief sought or the defense interposed." W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990); see also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 250-52, 254 (1897).

170

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17

The common law hints at several other potential doors in the wall
of immunity. The Bernstein exception, together with the principle that the
act of state doctrine should not preclude an action involving the application
of well-settled law where it would not disturb international relations, supports the argument that the act of state doctrine should not apply to torture
claims brought against former foreign officials. The fact that the act of state
doctrine and traditional immunities lose much of their force in the context
of suits against former heads of state and officials supports efforts to end
the use of the United States as a refuge for people who were responsible for
acts of torture in their former roles as foreign officials. Finally, the jus
cogens status of the prohibition against torture mandates at least some derogation from the traditional rules of immunity under fundamental principles
of customary and treaty-based international law.
Recent Update - April 21, 2011

At the time of publication, the district court has begun to address
alternative claims to immunity. In November 2010, Samantar filed a new
motion with the district court to dismiss the complaint. In his complaint, he
argued, among other things, that he was entitled to common law immunity.
On February 14, 2011, the U.S. government filed a Statement of Interest
asserting that Samantar was not entitled to immunity. As plaintiffs' counsel
notes, "[t]he filing is significant because the U.S. rarely intervenes in litigation where it is not a party, and it is extremely uncommon for the government to intervene to state that a defendant is not entitled to immunity." 72
The government's Statement of Interest asserts the Executive
branch's authority to determine the immunity from suit of a foreign official
in the United States.73 The discussion indicates that in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision last June, the Executive branch may in the future
choose to increase its role in determinations of who is entitled to sovereign
immunity. The government's reference to the alleged human rights abuses
at issue in Samantar suggests that the nature of the allegations may play
some part in the Executive branch's determination. 74
In addition to discussing the alleged abuses, the United States found
it particularly significant that Samantar is a former official of a state with no
currently recognized government to request immunity on his behalf, and
Center for Justice and Accountability, Case Summary, http://cja.org/article.php
?Iist=type&type=85 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
73 Statement of Interest of the United States of America at para. 3, Yousef v.
Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (LMB) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2011), availableat http:/
cja.org/downloads/SamantarStmt_ofInterest.pdf.
74 Id. at 4-5, n.2.
72
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that as a U.S. resident who enjoys the protection of U.S. laws, he should be
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, especially when being sued by
another U.S. resident.75
Once it received the government's submission, the district court
ruled the very next day. It denied Samantar's assertion of common law immunity in a one-page order based entirely on the Executive branch's determination. 76 This apparent willingness to go along with the government's
position sets the stage for future immunity determinations to rest firmly in
the hands of the Executive.
7
76

Id. at para. 9.

Yousef v. Samantar, No. 05 Civ. 1360 (LMB), (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011),
available at http://cja.org/downloads/SamantarOrderDenying Common Law_

Immunity.pdf.

